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NORTH DAKOTA'S STALKING LAW: CRIMINALIZING THE
CRIME BEFORE THE CRIME
I. INTRODUCTION
There are no words to express the pain, the shame, the fear, the
terror, the heartbreak, and complete hopelessness of living as a
victim of a stalker. Not only is there the loss of all freedom, but
also the loss of self-esteem, hopes, dreams, choices, friends,
employment, security, and safety -loss of a reason to go on
living.1
If one could interview all the victims of stalking and ask them to
summarize their experiences, perhaps they would all respond with a com-
pelling statement like the one above. The statement vividly expresses one
stalking victim's utter despair.2
Pam Norman also was a stalking victim.' She "had been followed
around town [by her estranged husband], had called the police on many
occasions, and [had] reported that her estranged husband was in her
home" 4-but no one would listen.5
Living in utter despair with fear for one's life and finding no one who
will listen is an all too common plight of stalking victims.6 This plight is
exacerbated when stalking victims discover that they do not have a legal
remedy available to them or, as often happens, that the legal remedy
available to them is ineffective in deterring their stalker's conduct.'
1. House Judiciary Standing Committee Minutes, H.B. 1237, N.D. 53rd Leg. Sess. (Ian 19,
1993) (testimony of Judi Markegard) [hereinafter House Judiciary Committee]. Judi Marke was
stalked by her ex-husband for over eight years. Id. She testifed in support of the stalking bill. ld.
The statement is an excerpt from her written testimony. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. (citing the testimony of Sue Leingang, sister of Pam Norman).
4. Id.
5. House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Sue Leingang. sister of
Pam Norman). Pam Norman asked for help from the police, but she could not get help until she had
concrete proof of her stalker's conduct. Id.
6. See id. (citing the testimony of stalking victims). Over an eight-year period, Judi Markegard
received four protection orders restraining her stalker. Id. None of the protection orders was
effective in preventing Judi's stalker from visiting his reign of terror upon her. Id. Though she was
receiving life-threatening letters and telephone calls, Connie Martin's daughter was unable to receive
any police protection. Id. Dawn Martin was told by the police that her stalker's conduct was not a
crime and there was nothing they could do to protect her. Id.
7. See Rosalind Resnick, States Enact "Stalking" Laws, NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1992, at 3
(discussing the impetus behind the national trend of enacting stalking laws). See also House Judiciary
Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of stalking victims). Several stalking victims testified in
support of a bill making stalking a crime. Id. These stalking victims testified that they did not have a
legal remedy available to them, or if they did have a legal remedy, it was unable to deter their stalker.
Id,
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Because the legal system has been unable to effectively serve stalking
victims, s state legislatures responded to the pleas for help with a prolifera-
tion of stalking laws.9 North Dakota joined this nationwide wave of legis-
lation by enacting its version of a stalking law in 1993.10 The North
Dakota law defines stalking as "an intentional course of conduct directed
at a specific person which frightens, intimidates, or harasses that person,
and which serves no legitimate purpose."" Thus, the law criminalizes the
typical threatening and harassing conduct of a stalker.'2
Stalking is a serious problem, 13 and until the enactment of stalking
laws, law enforcement was restrained in protecting the privacy and safety
of stalking victims. 14 The police could not help someone until a crime
was committed, and then, the help was often too late.' 5 This impaired
ability of the police to help someone in need was due in part to the lack of
appropriate laws.'"
When applying traditional criminal laws to stalking conduct, various
problems occur.17  For example, stalking conduct is threatening and
8. See infra notes 39-138 and accompanying text (discussing the limited applicability and
ineffectiveness of North Dakota's criminal and civil remedies in the stalking context),
9. See infra note 26 (citing the fifty states' stalking or stalking-related laws).
10. 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 120 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1993)).
11. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(b) (Supp. 1993).
12. Kenneth R. Thomas, How To Stop The Stalker: State Antistalking Laws, 29 CrIM. L. BULL.
124 (1993). Thomas defines stalking generally as "harassing or threatening behavior that an individual
engages in repeatedly, such as following a person, appearing at a person's home or place of business,
making harassing phone calls, leaving written messages or objects, or vandalizing a person's property."
Id. at 126.
13. See Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling The Terror Of Stalking But Some Experts Say
Measures Are Vague, USA TODAY, July 21, 1992, at 9A. Puente's article discusses the results of a
major study conducted on stalking indicating that approximately 200,000 people in the country are
stalking someone. Id. However, statistics concerning stalking, such as the number of stalking cases,
are not available from law enforcement agencies because, prior to the enactment of stalking laws,
stalking was not a crime. Telephone interview with Captain Dan Draovich, Minot Police
Department, Minot, North Dakota (June 30, 1993)).
14. See, e.g., 138 CONe. REC. S9527 (daily ed. July 1, 1992) (statement of Senator William
Cohen). Cohen discussed the case of an eleven year old girl who was stalked for nineteen months
before being suddenly kidnapped, repeatedly raped, and murdered. Id. The police, though aware of
the stalker's obsessive conduct, had taken no action against the stalker because, prior to kidnapping
the girl, he had committed no crime. Id.
15. I1. See also Melinda Beck, Murderous Obsession, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1992, at 60. Beck
cites the story of a woman who was stalked for six months by a stranger. Id. The woman's stalker
"finally shot her, set her body on fire and dumped it into a creek." Id. Another woman was "fatally
stabbed 19 times, allegedly by her ex-boyfrien , in a [] courthouse where she had gone to obtain a
protection order." Id.
16. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (statement of Captain Dan Draovich of the
Minot Police Department, Minot, North Dakota). Draovich testified in support of passing the
stalking bill and stated that law enforcement authorities were very frustrated and were "unable to do
their jobs due to lack of appropriate legislation." Id. But see Senate Judiciary Standing Committee
Minutes, H.B. 1237, N.D. 53rd Leg. Sess. (March 8, 1993) (statement of Senator Jim Maxson,
Chairman of Senate Judiciary Committee) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Committee]. Senator
Maxson asked Greg Runge, ACLU representative, if "he agreed that the attitude of law enforcement,
prosecuting attorneys and judges would be a far greater antidote for the problem [of stalking] than
legislation," and Runge responded, "yes, without a doubt." Id. at 5.
17. Matthew J. Gilligan, Stalking The Stalker Developing New Laws To Thwart Those Who
Terrorize Others, 27 GA. L. REv. 285 (1992). Criminal laws often have limited applicability in the
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harassing to the victim and often a precursor to future harm,18 but it may
not rise to the level of a criminal violation'9 or it may violate laws with
only minimal sanctions.2' Further compounding the deficiency in crimi-
nal remedies are the expense and uncertainty of civil remedies, 1 as well
as the ineffectiveness of civil remedies such as restraining orders, which
are the traditional means of protecting stalking victims.' Stalking laws
are intended to remedy these problems by filling the voids in the law.23
Furthermore, by giving police recourse before an attack takes place,24 the
laws are aimed at halting the pattern of threatening and harassing conduct
that often precedes violent acts, such as assault, rape, and murder.25
All fifty states have enacted stalking laws.26 In 1990, California
passed the first stalking law, and since 1990, the remaining forty-nine
stalking context because the laws do not address typical stalking conduct, and when the laws do apply,
their minimal sanctions do not adequately deter most stalkers. Id. at 295.
18. See Beck, supra note 15. Beck cites the stories of stalking victims whose lives ended fatally
after months of threats and harassment from their stalkers. Id. at 60. One of the most publicized
cases involved celebrity Rebecca Schaeffer, who was fatally shot by an obsessed fan. Id. See also
Thomas, supra note 12. -As many as 90% of women killed by their husbands or boyfriends have been
stalked prior to the attack." Id. at 126.
19. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-05 (1985) (defining the crime of menacing). The
crime of menacing in North Dakota requires placing a person in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury. Id. While a stalker may intend or threaten serious bodily injury, if the stalker's threat does not
denote sufficient imminence, such as speaking to some future unspecified time, the offense of
menacing is not committed. State v. Kurle, 390 N.W.2d 48, 49 (N.D. 1986).
20. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-01 (1)(a & b) (Supp. 1993) (defining the crime of
simple assault). The crime of simple assault, which requires bodily injury as an element of the
offense, is a class B misdemeanor. Id. A class B misdemeanor carries "a maximum penalty of thirty
days' imprisonment, a fine of five hundred dollars, or both ... " 12.1-32-01(6) (1985).
21. Gilligan, supra note 17. Gilligan discusses the prohibitive financial requirements and
dangerous time delays facing stalking victims when bringing a civil action against a stalker. Id. at 292.
22. Wayne E. Bradburn, Stalking Statutes: An Ineffective Legislative Remedy For Rectifijing
Perceived Problems With Today's Injuction System, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 271 (1992). Bradburn
blames the ineffectiveness of restraining orders on statutory prerequisites for obtaining the order,
judicial reluctance to grant the order, police refusal to make arrests for restraining order violations,
and judicial unwillingness to punish restraining order violators. Id. at 273-83.
23. House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (testimony of Representative Ron Carlisle). Rep.
Carlisle stated that the stalking law would fill some gaps in the present law. Id.
24. Thomas, supra note 12, at 124.
25. Id. at 126.
26. Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-90 to -92 (Supp. 1993); Alaska, 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40 (to
be codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.260 to .270 (1993)); Arkansas, 1993 Ark. Acts 379; California,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111 (1986);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-181c to 181d (Supp. 1993); Delaware, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (1992); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 1992); Georgia, GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-5-90 to -93 (Harrison Supp. 1993); Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. § 711.1106.5 (Supp. 1992);
Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1993); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 to 7.4
(Smith-Hurd 1993); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-10-1 to -5 (Bums Supp. 1993); Iowa, IowA
CODE ANN. § 708.11 (West 1993); Kansas, 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298; Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 508.130 to .150 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2
(West Supp. 1993); Maine, 1993 Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. art. 27,
§ 121B (Supp. 1993); Massachusetts, MASS. CEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1993);
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.411h to .411i (West Supp. 1993); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (West 1994); Mississippi, 1992 Miss. Laws 532; Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 455.010 (Vernon 1993); Montana, 1993 Mont. Laws 292; Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-311.02
to .04 (1993); Nevada, 1993 Nev. Stat. 233; New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 633.3-a (1993);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West Supp. 1993); New Mexico, 1993 N.M. Laws 86; North
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states have followed suit and have passed stalking laws.27 North Dakota
enacted its stalking law in 1993.' This rapid development in state law did
not go unnoticed.2 9 In 1992, the United States Congress enacted legisla-
tion directing the Attorney General, through the National Institute of Jus-
tice, to develop a model stalking law.30 The National Institute of Justice
recently completed the project,"' and although the fifty states already
have enacted stalking laws, 32 the model stalking law nonetheless is avail-
able to the states to help them evaluate the enforceability and effective-
ness of their stalking laws.-a
This Note focuses on North Dakota's stalking law. Part II examines
the various criminal and civil remedies that were available to stalking vic-
tims before the enactment of the stalking law. The examination reveals
why the legal system had been unable to effectively serve stalking victims.
Part III provides a detailed analysis'of North Dakota's stalking law and
includes an assessment of the constitutionality of the law. The constitu-
tionality is assessed by reviewing the principal constitutional challenges of
overbreadth and vagueness, and the law is evaluated against such chal-
lenges. In conclusion, this Note characterizes North Dakota's stalking law
as an important addition to the legal arsenal. The law is an attempt to
provide affirmative protection to stalking victims and is a necessary step
toward a solution to the stalking problem.
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (1993); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1
(Supp. 1993); Ohio, 1992 Ohio Legis. Serv. 234 (Baldwin); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1173 (West Supp. 1994); Oregon, 1993 Or. Laws ch. 626; Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2709
(1983 & Supp. 1993); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-59-1 to -3 (Supp. 1993); South Carolina,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1070 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 22-19A-1 to -7 (Supp. 1993); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1993); Texas, TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp.
1993); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1061 to 1063 (Supp. 1993); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1993); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp.
1993); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (Supp. 1993); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-506 (1993).
Three states have laws that are not called stalking but which apply to stalking situations. Arizona,
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (Supp. 1993); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.13 to .15; 240.25 to
.30 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1994); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1993).
27. See supra note 26 (citing the fifty states' stalking or stalking-related laws).
28. See infra note 144 (reproducing North Dakota's stalking law).
29. See Pub. L. No. 102-395 § 109(b) (1992) (directing the development of a model stalking
law).
30. Id.
31. PROJECT TO DEVELOP A MODEL ANTI-STALKING CODE FOR STATES, NATIONAL INSTITuTE
OF JUSTICE, (U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 1993) [hereinafter Model Anti-Stalking Code]. The final report
of the project to develop a model stalking law includes, among other things, a model stalking law, a
profile of existing state stalking laws, and a strategy for managing stalking cases and implementing
stalking laws. I& at xiil-iv.
32. See supra note 26 (citing stalking or stalking-related laws of the fifty states).
33. See Model Anti-Stalking Code, supra note 31, at 5.
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II. LEGAL REMEDIES BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF
NORTH DAKOTA'S STALKING LAW
Numerous individuals testified before the North Dakota House and
Senate Judiciary Committees in support of the stalking bill.m Many of
the individuals testifying were stalking victims who, in recounting their
personal stories, expressed their frustration with a legal system that they
believed should serve them. 5
Notwithstanding this frustration, North Dakota's legal system did not
necessarily fail to serve stalking victims; rather, it did not anticipate the
insidious conduct of stalking. Moreover, stalking victims, their stalkers,
and their stalkers' methods are extremely diverse.37 Given the myriad of
situations in which stalking occurs, the legal system is presented with the
difficult challenge of providing meaningful relief and protection to stalk-
ing victims.38
North Dakota's legal system has various criminal and civil remedies,
absent a stalking law, applicable to stalking conduct.39 The criminal laws
available are simple assault, terrorizing, menacing, harassment, and disor-
derly conduct.' The civil remedies include common law tort actions,
34. House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1. The individuals testifying in support of the
stalking bill included stalking victims, legislators, state officials, law enforcement officials, and
representatives of various groups. Id. See also Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 16.
35. House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1. Seven individuals testified about either their own
or a family member's e erience as a stalking victim. Id. One of the individuals telling the story of
her sister's death at the=hands of her sister's estranged husband stated that "[t]he judicial system has
no idea what is going on, and they just really don't care." Id. Another individual relating the story of
her daughter said, "You can imagine our fear and frustration when we found that [our daughter's]
case falls into some gaps in the law." Id. See also Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 16.
36. See infra notes 39-138 and accompanying text (discussing the limited applicability and
ineffectiveness of North Dakota's criminal and civil remedies in the stalking context). See also State v.
Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d 243, 246 (N.D. 1975) (recognizing the inability of legislatures to anticipate
the unforeseen variations of fact situations that may arise under a statute).
37. See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 16. The diversity of stalking victims, their
stalkers, and their stalkers' methods was illustrated through the testimony of individuals supporting
the stalking bill. Id. Connie Martin's daughter was a public figure in broadcasting, her stalker was a
stranger, and her stalker employed threatening and harassing communications as his means of stalking
her. Id. Dawn Martin was a correctional officer, her stalker was a former inmate, and her stalker's
tactics involved maintaining a surveillance of her and her property. Id. Judi Markegard's former
spouse undertook every stalking method available to him, short of committing a seriously punishable
crime, to make her life a living hell. Id. His methods included following Judi everywhere she went,
assaulting her, vandalizing her property, and making threats on her life by letter and by telephone.
Id. His reign of terror continued tor over eight years. Id.
38. See infra notes 193-195 and accompanying text (discussing the susceptibility of stalking laws
to the constitutional challenges of overbreaath and vagueness).
39. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (discussing North Dakota's criminal and civil
remedies applicable to stalking conduct).
40. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-01 (Supp. 1993) (simple assault); § 12.1-17-04 (1985)
(terrorizing); § 12.1-17-05 (1985) (menacing); § 12.1-17-07 (harassment); § 12.1-31-01 (Supp. 1993)
(disorderly conduct). These are the crimes that law enforcement authorities likely would have used in
seeking prosecution against a stalker before the enactment of the stalking law. Telephone interview
with Jim Vukelic, Chief Deputy Attorney General, State of North Dakota (June 30, 1993). While
other crimes, such as criminal trespass and criminal mischief, may be available to stalking victims,
discussion of all potentially available criminal remedies is beyond the scope of this Note. This Note is
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such as invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress,4 ' for victims seeking monetary damages from their stalker4" or
domestic violence protection orders for victims seeking the restraint of
their stalker.43
The applicability of the criminal laws, however, is limited in many
stalking cases because they do not address typical stalking conduct.44
Furthermore, even when the criminal laws do apply, their minimal sanc-
tions do not adequately deter most stalkers.4 Civil remedies suffer the
shortcomings of being expensive and uncertain,46 and, particularly in the
case of protection orders, ineffective.47 The following discussion of these
criminal and civil remedies reveals the lack of meaningful relief and pro-
tection provided to stalking victims. 48
A. CRIMINAL REMEDIES
1. Simple Assault
Simple assault is defined as willfully or negligently causing bodily
injury to another human being.49 Because bodily injury is an element of
the offense, 50 the crime often will not be available in stalking cases.5 ' A
stalker may threaten bodily injury,5" but if the stalker does not actually
inflict bodily injury, simple assault is not committed.53 Furthermore, sim-
ple assault carries a class B misdemeanor penalty of thirty days' imprison-
limited to discussing the selected crimes for purposes of illustrating the inapplicability of the crime in
the typical stalking case or the ineffectiveness of the punishment in deterring a stalker's conduct.
41. W. PACE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TonTs § 1, at 3 (5th ed.
1984) (stating that torts are civil wrongs); id. at xxv, xxix (listing invasion of privacy and intentional
infliction of emotional distress as torts).
42. Id. § 2, at 7. A successful plaintiff in a civil action for a tort receives a monetary judgment
enforceable against that plaintiffs wrongdoer. Id.
43. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (Supp. 1993) (domestic violence protection order). The
relief provided by the domestic violence protection order includes restraining a party from having
contact with another party. Id. at § 14-07.1-02(4)(a).
44. See infra notes 49-87 and accompanying text (discussing the limited applicability of criminal
laws in the stalking context).
45. See, e.g., infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of minimal penalties
on deterring stalkers).
46. See infra notes 88-121 and accompanying text (discussing the expense and uncertainty of the
common law civil remedies of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
47. See infra notes 122-134 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness of the
domestic violence protection order).
48. See infra notes 49-138 (discussing the limited applicability and ineffectiveness of North
Dakota's criminal and civil remedies in the stalking context).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-01 (Supp. 1993).
50. Id.
51. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Connie Martin and
Dawn Martin). Connie Martin's daughter was stalked by a stranger who repeatedly threatened bodily
injury but did not act on the threats. Id. Dawn Martin's stalker never threatened bodily injury;
rather, he maintained an intimidating surveillance over her and her property. Id.
52. Id (citing the testimony of Connie Martin).
53. State v. Sheldon, 301 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002 (1981).
'[Aissault defines what is commonly considered a battery.... [Blodily injury... must result before
an offender is guilty of assault." Id. at 610.
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ment. 4 This penalty, particularly in the case of a repeat offender, is
unlikely to deter future stalking conduct.'
Deterring undesirable conduct is one of the general functions of a
criminal law.m This function is served through the law's punishment
scheme.57 As a general rule, the deterrent effect of a criminal law
increases as the severity of punishment increases.58 Persons are less
inclined to commit a crime imposing a high penalty.59 Thus, a crime car-
rying a minimal penalty, such as thirty days' imprisonment for simple
assault,' is less effective in deterring future conduct.6 '
2. Terrorizing
A terrorizing conviction carries a penalty of five years' imprison-
ment.62 Even though this heavier penalty serves as a more effective
deterrent to stalkers,63 the crime of terrorizing has limited applicability in
most stalking cases. 64
To successfully convict a stalker of terrorizing, the state must prove
that the stalker threatened the victim with a violent crime or a dangerous
act and that the stalker intended to place the victim in fear for that vic-
tim's safety.65 The stalker's threat must be communicated orally, to and
54. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-01(2) (Supp. 1993) (stating that simple assault is a class B
misdemeanor); § 12.1-32-01(6) (1985) (defining the onalty r  class B misdemeanor as thirty days'
imprisonment, a fine of five hundred dollars, or both).
55. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony ofJudi Markegard). Judi
Markegard's stalker assaulted her numerous times. Id. Each time he was put in jail for the maximum
period of thirty days. Id. Immediately upon his release from jail, he resumed stalking her. Id.
56. LAFAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (2d ed. 1986). Preventing undesirable conduct and
encouraging desirable conduct are the broad purposes of criminal law. Id. at 22-23. These purposes
are accomplished through the threat of punishment. Id. Deterrence is one of the theories of
punishment for influencing conduct. Id. at 23-24. The other theories are prevention, restraint,
rehabilitation, education, and retribution. Id at 22-26.
57. Id.
58. Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949,
970 (1966).
59. /d
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-01(2) (Supp. 1993) (stating that simple assault is a class B
misdemeanor); § 12.1-32-01(6) (1985) (defining the penalty for a class B misdemeanor as thirty days'
imprisonment, a fine of five hundred dollars, or both).
61. Andenaes, supra note 58. However, the penalty must match the gravity of the offense. Id.
If the penalty is excessively severe, the public will not inform the police, the prosecutors will not
secute, and the juries will not convict. Id Therefore, the result will be fewer convictions and no
deterrence. Id.
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-04 (1985) (stating that terrorizing is a class C felony); § 12.1-
32-01(4) (1985) (defining the penalty for a class C felony as five years' imprisonment, a ine of five
thousand dollars, or both).
63. See Andenaes, supra note 58. Persons are less inclined to commit a crime imposing a high
penalty. Id.
64. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing the limited applicability of
terrorizing in the stalking context).
65. State v. Zeno, 490 N.W.2d 707, 710 (N.D. 1992) (discussing the elements necessary to
establish the offense of terrorizing).
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in the presence of, the victim,6 and only the gravest threatened offense,
such as murder, satisfies the element of a violent crime or a dangerous
act.67 Conduct that establishes terrorizing includes pointing a gun at a
person and threatening to shoot a persono8 or making threats on a per-
son's life in the context of a fight.69 This conduct does not encompass the
conduct of a stalker who communicates threats in writing or by tele-
phone7' or the stalker who never makes a threat but persistently main-
tains a surveillance of a victim.
7 1
3. Menacing
Menacing requires placing another in fear of imminent, serious bod-
ily injury.72 Stalking conduct frequently does not rise to the level of men-
acing because it may not denote sufficient imminence.73
66. See Zeno, 490 N.W.2d at 710 (finding a sufficient allegation of terrorizing in which the
customer of a cab driver told the driver that he was "on a mission to kill somebody and that he might
kill [the driver], too"); State v. Kurle, 390 N.W.2d 48, 49 (N.D. 1986) (stating that defendant's
threatening words to another party as he was leaving a fight, "when you are up here alone, we will get
you," might support a terrorizing conviction); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2 456, 463 (N.D. 1978)
(finding a sufficient threat when the defendant, while standing within a few feet of a car and pointing
a rifle at the car's occupants, threatened to "blow the heads off" the car's occupants). But see State v.
Gefroh, 495 N.W.2d 651, 655 (N.D. 1993) (finding that, because of the defendant's earlier actions of
assaulting the victim during a domestic dispute, the defendant's threat to the victim that she might
"not wake up" constituted terrorizing even though it was communicated over the telephone and not in
the victim's presence).
67. See supra note 66 (discussing terrorizing cases in which the violent crime or dangerous act
threatened was murder or the threat alluded to murder). Cf. State v. Plentychief, 464 N.W.2d 373
(N.D. 1990). The court found that the defendant's attempt to abduct a child by saying, "Well, I'm
your mommy now," "Come on, let's go," was insufficient as a threat of violence or dangerous act. Id.
at 373, 376.
68. See Zeno, 490 N.W.2d at 710. After threatening he might kill the cab driver, the defendant
shot the gun within earshot of the driver and then pointed the muzzle at the driver. Id. The court
found the defendant's actions sufficent to establish terrorizing. Id. See also Hass, 268 N.W.2d at 463.
While standing within a few feet of a car and pointing a rifle at the car's occupants, the defendant
threatened to "blow the heads off? the car's occupants. Id. The court stated that "[iut should be no
surprise to anyone [that the car's occupants] were terrorized or considered themselves menaced." Id.
69. See Gefroh, 495 N.W.2d at 655. After assaulting the victim during a domestic dispute, the
defendant called the victim and threatened that she woufd "not wake up." Id. The court found this
sufficient evidence to support a terrorizing conviction. Id. See also Kurle, 390 N.W.2d at 49. The
court found that the defendant's words to another person as he was leaving after a fight, "when you
are up here alone, we will get you," might support a terrorizing conviction. Id.
70. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Connie Martin).
Connie Martin's daughter was stalked by a stranger who sent life-threatening letters and made sexual
demands and references to violence over the telephone. Id. See also supra notes 65-69 and
accompanying text (discussing conduct sufficient to establish terrorizing).
71. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Dawn Martin). For
three years, Dawn Martin's stalker watched Dawn and her family but never communicated with her.
Id. On various occasions, he left lewd remnants of his presence. Id. See also supra notes 65-69 and
accompanying text (discussing conduct sufficient to establish terrorizing).
72. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-05 (1985). A person who "knowingly places or attempts to
place another human being in fear by menacing him with imminent serious bodily injury" is guilty of
the class A misdemeanor of menacing. Id.
73. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (discussing the limited applicability of
menacing in the stalking context).
1994] NOTE
Imminent means immediate or something that is "ready to fall or
happen on the instant."7 4 "Serious bodily injury" requires substantial risk
of death or permanent disfigurement.75 While stalking conduct may
include threats of serious bodily injury, 6 unless the victim fears bodily
injury at that moment, the stalker will not have committed the crime of
menacing.77 Therefore, typical stalking conduct, such as threatening and
harassing communications in writing or by telephone78 or maintaining a
surveillance over the victim,79 does not fall within the punishable conduct
of menacing.80
4. Harassment
The crime of harassment encompasses the typical stalking conduct of
threatening and harassing communications in writing or by telephone,"
but it does not include the more serious conduct of stalkers who indefati-
gably maintain an intimidating presence in the life of their victims.8 2
Moreover, even when harassment does apply to stalking conduct, the
crime provides a minimal penalty, one which fails to deter future stalking
conduct.83
74. State v. Kurle, 390 N.W.2d 48, 49 (N.D. 1986) (defining the word "imminent" for purposes
of the menacing offense).
75. N.D. CErr. CODE § 12.1-01-04(28) (Supp. 1993) (defining "serious bodily injury").
76. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Connie Martin and
Judi Markegard). Connie Martin's daughter was stalked by a stranger who repeatedly sent life-
threatening letters and made references to violence over the telephone. Id Besides repeatedly
assaulting her and vandalizing her property, Judi Markegard's stalker also made life-threatening
telephone calls to her and her family and friends. Id.
77. Kude, 390 N.W.2d at 49. Because defendant was unarmed and leaving the scene of a fight,
his threatening words to the other party, "when you are up here alone, we will get you," spoke to the
future and were not sufficiently immediate. Id. "By imminent danger is meant immediate danger-
one that must be instantly met; one that can not be guarded against by calling on the assistance of
others or the protection of the law." Id. at 49 n.2.
78. See supra note 76 (citing the testimony of stalking victims whose stalkers made threatening
and harassing communications in letters and over the telephone).
79. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Dawn Martin and Judi
Markegard). For three years, Dawn's stalker maintained a surveillance of Dawn and her family by
watching them, hiding in their carport, and coming by their street. Id. Over an eight year period,
Judi Markegard's stalker followed her everywhere she went, including when she twice moved to a
different city. Id.
80. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing conduct necessary to establish
menacing). See also supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (citing examples of stalking conduct
that cannot constitute menacing).
81. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07 (1) (1985). Harassment covers a threat to inflict injury
which is communicated in writing or by telephone, anonymous telephone calls, offensively coarse
language used in a telephone call, and repeated telephone calls which have no legitimate purpose. Id
See also Thomas, supra note 12, at 126 (giving a general definition of stalking conduct.
82. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07 (1) (1985). Harassment does not encompass stalking
conduct such as persistently following a person or repeatedly committing acts to annoy or alarm a
person. Id. See also House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Judi
Markegard and Dawn Martin). Judi Markegard's stalker followed her everywhere she went for over
eight years. Id. Dawn Martin's stalker watched Dawn and her family for over three years, and he
would leave lewd remnants of his presence, such as used condoms and wet deposits on her car. Id.
83. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07(2) (1985). Harassment is a class B misdemeanor, id., which
carries a penalty of thirty-day's imprisonment, § 12.1-32-01(6) (1985). However, if the offender
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:159
5. Disorderly Conduct
Disorderly conduct applies to broad types of conduct, including, but
not limited to, engaging in fighting or threatening behavior, using abusive
or obscene language or gestures in a public place, persistently following a
person in or about a public place, or creating a seriously alarming condi-
tion by any act which serves no legitimate purpose.84 While the offense
covers typical stalling conduct,s5 it provides a minimal penalty of thirty
days' imprisonment,' which is not likely to be effective in deterring the
more serious stalkers, particularly repeat offenders.8 7
B. CIVIL REMEDIES
1. Common Law Tort Actions
Stalking victims may also try to avail themselves of civil relief with
common law tort actions, such as invasion of privacy and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.m The expense involved in asserting the
actions, however, renders them beyond the reach of many stalking vic-
tims.8 9 Moreover, when asserting a civil action, stalking victims often face
uncertainty because the actions have limited applicability in the stalking
context.2
The expense of bringing a civil action is an insurmountable obstacle
for many stalking victims who lack the financial resources necessary to
pursue a civil claim. 9 Women are the stalking victims in the majority of
communicates a threat to inflict injury, the penalty is increased to a class A misdemeanor penalty of
one year's imprisonment. § 12.1-17-07(2); §12.1-32-01(5). See also supra notes 56-61 (discussing
the deterrence function of criminal laws).
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01 (Supp. 1993) (defining disorderly conduct).
85. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 126 (giving a general definition of stalking conduct). See also
House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1. Staln victims testified to the various methods of
stalking employed by their stalkers. Id. The methods included making threatening and harassing
communications, persistently following the victim, and maintaining a surveillance of the victim. Id.
86. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01 (Supp. 1993). Disorderly conduct is a class B misdemeanor.
Id. A class B misdemeanor carries a penalty of thirty days' imprisonment. § 12.1-32-01(6) (1985).
87. See supra notes 56-61 (discussing the deterrence function of criminal laws). See also House
Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Judi Markegard). Judi Markegards
stalker was repeatedly jailed for committing class B misdemeanor offenses. Id. Immediately upon his
release from jail, he resumed stalking Judi. Id.
88. Andrea J. Robinson, A Remedial Approach To Harassment, 70 VA. L. REV. 507 (1984).
Other common law actions exist, but "[tihe actions for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress provide the most promising means of relief in diverse [stalking] situations." Id. at
517.
89. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing the financial obstacle facing the
majority of stalking victims).
90. See infra notes 95-114 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty of a civil action).
91. Robinson, supra note 88, at 514 (stating that the party bringing a civil action bears the costs
of litigation). See also Thomas, supra note 12, at 128 (discussing the civil process of hiring a lawyer,
paying court costs, developing a case, and following the legal process); Bradbum, supra note 22, at
273 (discussing the filing fees involved in obtaining the civil relief of a restraining order).
1994] NOTE
stalking cases,9' and women often have substantially lower earnings than
men . 3 As a result, the majority of stalking victims may not be able to
afford a civil action. 4
If able to overcome the expense of a civil action, the stalking victim
then faces the uncertainty of asserting a successful claim. 5 One of the
two civil tort actions that stalking victims may bring against their stalkers
is invasion of privacy. 6 A successful claim for invasion of privacy requires
the stalking victim to prove that the stalker intentionally interfered with
that victim's interest in solitude or seclusion in a manner that was unrea-
sonable and highly offensive.97 Also, the interference with the victim's
privacy interests must be in an area that is entitled to privacy, such as the
victim's home, but not in public places, such as streets.' Following a
person in public does not qualify as an invasion of privacy, nor do bad
manners and insulting gestures in public. However, peering into the
windows of a home and making persistent and unwanted telephone calls
are considered privacy intrusions.' ° Therefore, stalking victims whose
stalkers window-peep or make repeated telephone calls will be able to
assert invasion of privacy claims,' 1 but stalkers who make insulting ges-
tures to their victims or who follow and observe their victims in public will
be immune from the claim.10 2
The second tort action that stalking victims may bring against their
stalker is intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 0 3  This action
requires the stalking victim to prove that the stalker intentionally or reck-
92. Thomas, supra note 12, at 126. However, women stalking men is not unknown. Beck, supra
note 15, at 61.
93. Bradburn, supra note 22, at 273.
94. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing the financial obstacles facing the
majority of stalking victims).
95. See infra notes 96-114 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty of a civil action).
96. Robinson, supra note 88, at 517 (stating that "[tihe actions for invasion of privacy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress provide the most promising means of relief in diverse
[stalking] situations.-).
97. Keeton et al., supra note 41, § 117, at 854. Keeton states that there are four forms of
invasion of privacy, one of which is intrusion upon one's solitude or seclusion. Id. at 851-63.
Intrusion upon one's solitude or seclusion is the form of invasion of privacy that is applicable in the
stalking context. Robinson, supra note 88, at 517. The North Dakota Supreme Court recognized
Keeton's four forms of invasion of privacy in City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d
572, 578 n.3 (N.D. 1981), but assumed, without explicitly deciding, that an action for invasion of
privacy exists. American Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Jordan, 315 N.W.2d 290, 295 (N.D. 1982).
98. Keeton et al., supra note 41, § 117 at 854-55 (stating that one form of interference consists
of invading the person's home, but that a person has no legal right to be left alone on a public street
or in any other public place).
99. Id. at 855.
100. Id.
101. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Connie Martin).
Connie Martin's daughter was stalked by a stranger who repeatedly made threatening and harassing
telephone calls. Id.
102. See supra notes 79, 82 (citing the testimony of stalking victims).
103. Robinson, supra note 88, at 517 (stating that -[tlhe actions for invasion of privacy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress provide the most promising means of relief in diverse
[stalking] situations.").
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lessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused severe
emotional distress.'1 4 The extreme and outrageous conduct must be atro-
cious, utterly intolerable, and exceed all bounds of a decent society.1' 5
Mere annoyances, such as profanity, obscenity, insults, indignities, or
threats, generally do not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. 1°6
Many stalkers engage in conduct that might be considered a mere annoy-
ance, therefore precluding those stalking victims from asserting successful
claims.' 0 7 Other stalkers, however, cause their victims to live in a contin-
uous state of fear and will not be immune from suit. 108
Even if the stalking victim proves the threshold extreme and outra-
geous conduct, the victim must show that the conduct caused severe emo-
tional distress.1 "o The distress necessary to support a claim depends on
the degree of outrageousness of the stalker's conduct."0 Many stalking
victims experience great fear and anxiety,"' which may satisfy the requi-
site level of distress."12  However, there are many more stalking victims
who suffer distress, but their stalkers' conduct does not amount to
104. Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1989). The three elements of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress are "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct that is (2)
intentional or reckless and that causes (3) severe emotional distress." Id. at 923-24.
105. Id. at 924.
106. Id. See also Keeton et al., supra note 41, § 12, at 59 (stating that there will be no recovery
for mere annoyances absent aggravating circumstances).
107. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Connie Martin and
Dawn Martin). Connie Martin's daughter was stalked by a stranger who made threats and sexual
demands in letters and telephone calls. Id. Dawn Martin's stalker engaged in lewd, sexual activities
with himself in Dawn's presence and left used condoms and wet deposits on her car. Id. See also
supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text (discussing actionable and nonactionable extreme and
outrageous conduct).
108. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing testimony of Judi Markegard). Judi
Markegard's stalker terrorized her for over eight years by assaulting her, vandalizing her property,
making threats on her life, and following her everywhere she went. See also supra notes 104-106 and
accompanying text (discussing actionable and nonactionable extreme and outrageous conduct).
109. Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1989). A successful claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress requires a showing of 'extreme and outrageous conduct that is...
intentional or reckless and that. .. causes severe emotional distress." hI at 923-24.
110. Id. at 924 (stating that "the degree of outrageousness of a defendant's conduct may itself be
important evidence of severe emotional distress necessary to support a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress").
111. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Judi Markegard).
Beginning in 1982 and continuing for over eight years, Judi Markegard's stalker terrorized her with
assaults, threats, and vandalism. Id She has not seen him since 1990, but she "still [lives] in fear, still
[looks] over her shoulder, still [is] afraid to be alone at night, and still [has] nightmares." Id.
112. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 924. The extreme and -outrageous conduct must be atrocious,
utterly intolerable, and must exceed all bounds of a decent society. Id. See also generally Angela M.
Elsperger, Damages-Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress In The Workplace: Defining
Extreme And Outrageous Conduct In North Dakota's Job Description, 70 N.D. L REv. 187 (1994)
(discussing requisite severe emotional distress in an employee/employer situation). But see Muchow,
435 N.W.2d at 918. In Muchow, the court did not find a police officer's remarks to family members
sufficient to establish extreme and outrageous conduct. Id. at 924-25. After the loss of a family
member allegedly by suicide, the police officer made false statements regarding the death and
described the grim details of the death to the family. Id.
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extreme and outrageous." 3  Those victims will be unable to recover
damages.1 14
The expense and uncertainty of a civil action are significant hurdles
facing stalking victims.11 5 However, even more disheartening is that pre-
vailing in a civil action may not provide the relief sought by the stalking
victim.' Stalking victims want protection from their stalkers, and they
want the stalking to stop," 7 but the remedy in a civil action is a monetary
judgment."" Furthermore, a monetary judgment is useless when the
stalker is unable to pay. 1 9 In the context of criminal restitution to crime
victims, "few defendants have sufficient financial resources with which to
compensate their victims."12° Moreover, monetary liability might not stop
the stalker's conduct.'1
2
2. Protection Orders
As an alternative to a civil action seeking monetary damages, stalking
victims may seek the restraint of their stalker by obtaining a protection
113. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Connie Martin and
Dawn Martin). Connie Martin's daughter was subjected to threats and sexual demands in letters and
telephone calls. Id She and her family lived in eat fear. Id. Dawn Martin was subjected to
obscene behavior. Id. Her stalker also maintained a surveillance of Dawn and her property. Id.
Dawn is fearful that she and her family will never be safe from her stalker. Id.
114. Swenson v. Northern Crop Insurance, 498 N.W.2d 174, 182 (N.D. 1993) (stating that,
because of the rigourous standard applied, extreme and outrageous conduct is not easy to
demonstrate). See also supra notes 104-106 (discussing actionable and nonactionable extreme and
outrageous conduct).
115. See supra notes 88-114 and accompanying text (discussing the expense and uncertainty of
civil actions).
116. Keeton et al., supra note 41, § 2, at 7. Prevailing in a civil action gives the successful
plaintiff a monetary judgment enforceable against that plaintiffs wrongdoer, but it does not give that
plaintiff protection from the stalker nor does it give an assurance that the stalking will stop. Id
117. See House judiciary committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of stalking victims).
Connie Martin's daughter sought every avenue possible to get protection from her stalker. Id. Also,
she and the police unsuccessfully told her stalker to stop harassing her. Id. Likewise, Dawn Martin's
stalker was not receptive when told to stop stalking Dawn and her family. Id. Dawn was able to get a
protection order, but she did not have a criminal remedy available to her. Id. Judi Markegard had
numerous criminal and civil remedies available to her, none of which were successful in stopping her
stalker. Id. She even twice moved to a new city to rid herself of her stalker's torment. -d
118. Keeton et al., supra note 41, § 2, at 7.
119. Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies For The Victirs Of Crime: Assessing The Role Of The
Criminal Courts, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 52 (1982). Harland discusses the futility of criminal restitution
when the amount that the defendant is required to pay is beyond that defendant's financial means.
Id at 91-92.
120. Id at 59.
121. Id The theory that criminal restitution serves a rehabilitative purpose, as either
correctional or beneficial to a defendant, is not supported. Id. at 122-23. See also House Judiciary
Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Judi Markegard). Judi Markegard's stalker was
jailed numerous times. Id. Immediately upon his release, he resumed stalking her. Id
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order.12 However, a protection order is not universally available and, if
obtained, is often ineffective in deterring the stalker.'2
North Dakota provides for a protection order in its Adult Abuse
Act. 124 A stalking victim with a protection order obtains relief which
includes restraining the stalker from threatening, molesting, injuring, or
having contact with that victim.'2 5 The protection order, however, is only
available to those stalking victims who are family or household members
of the stalker or who have some relationship with the stalker.'12 There-
fore, those stalking victims whose stalker is a stranger are precluded from
obtaining a protection order because they do not have a prior relationship
with their stalker. 12 7
In addition to a prior relationship with the stalker, the stalking victim
must show "actual or imminent [physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault]." 2s Many stalkers threaten but do not inflict physical injury,129
and often the threat is not imminent.' 3 Consequently, a stalking victim
who cannot show an existing physical injury or the threat of physical
injury at that moment will be precluded from obtaining a protection
order.131
Even if a stalking victim is able to obtain a protection order, stalkers
often do not comply with the order.132 Repeated violations of protection
122. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (Supp. 1993). The relief provided by the domestic
violence protection order includes, among other things, restraining a party from having contact with
another party. Id.
123. See infra notes 124-134 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacy and
ineffectiveness of a protection order).
124. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (Supp. 1993) (domestic violence protection order).
125. § 14-07.1-02(4)(a).
126. § 14-07.1-02(1) (stating that a protection order is available to family or household members
or any other person with a sufficient relationship to the abusing person).
127. Id. See also House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Connie
Martin and Dawn Martin). Connie Martin's daughter was unable to obtain a protection order
because her stalker was a stranger. Id. Dawn Martin was told that because she did not have a prior
relationship with her stalker, she would not be able to obtain a protection order. Id. However, Dawn
was able to convince the court that a -relationship" existed in her stalker's mind, and she was then
able to obtain the order. Id.
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(4). The party requesting the protection order has the
burden of proving -actual or imminent domestic violence." Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76, 80
(N.D. 1992). Domestic violence is defined as "physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of
fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.., on the [party requesting the protection
order]." Id.
129. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Connie Martin and
Dawn Martin). Connie Martin's daughter was stalked by a stranger who made threats and sexual
demands through letters and telephone calls but who never inflicted injury on her. Id. Dawn
Martin's stalker maintained an intimidating surveillance over Dawn and her property but neither
threatened nor inflicted injury on her. Id.
130. Id See also supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing conduct sufficient to
establish imminence for purposes of the offense of menacing).
131. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d at 80. The required showing for aprotection order is actual or
imminent domestic violence. Id Actual means existing presently in fact. Id Imminent means on
the point of happening or a danger that must be instantly met. Id.
132. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Dawn Martin and
Judi Markegard). Dawn Martin's stalker violated her protection order at least three times. l. Judi
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orders are not uncommon,'3 and the penalty for and enforcement of a
violation are frequently inadequate in deterring the stalker's conduct 3
Though North Dakota's legal system provides various criminal and
civil remedies to stalking victims, the applicability and effectiveness of the
remedies are insufficient or nonexistent in the stalking context." The
inadequacy of these remedies cannot be tolerated considering the harm
inflicted.1 3' A stalker's conduct has a profound effect upon the conscious-
ness, physical well-being, and freedom of the stalking victim.131 Victims
often live their lives under siege, unsure of the dangers they face and
unable to obtain adequate protection from the legal system."a
III. ANALYSIS OF NORTH DAKOTA'S STALKING LAW AND
EVALUATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. NORTH DAKOTA'S STALKING LAW
North Dakota's stalking law was introduced in 1993.' No one
opposed the bill,140 and it passed unanimously in both the House and the
Markegard obtained four protection orders over an eight year period, and her stalker violated the
order countless times. Il
133. Id.
134. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (Supp. 1993). Violating a protection order is a class A
misdemeanor with a penalty of one year's imprisonment. Id.; § 12.1-32-01(5) (1985) (defining class A
misdemeanor penalty). See also House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of
Dawn Martin and Judi Markegard). Dawn Martin's stalker received a jail sentence each time he
violated Dawn's protection order; however, each subsequent sentence was lessened to the point of a
completely suspended sentence. Id. Neither the jail sentence nor the threat of a jail sentence
deterred Dawn's stalker from continuing to reappear in Dawn's neighborhood. Id. Judi Markegard's
stalker received numerous jail sentences for violating Judi's protection order, but the sentences were
hopelessly ineffective in deterring his conduct. Id. Each time he was released from jail, he resumed
stalkng Judi. Id.
135. See supra notes 39-134 and accompanying text (discussing the limited applicability and the
ineffectiveness of North Dakota's criminal and civil remedies in the stalking context).
136. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Connie Martin,
Dawn Martin, and Judi Markegard). For several months, Connie Martin's daughter lived in fear of
her stalker. Id. Her experience was very frightening for her and her family. Id. For three years,
Dawn Martin lived in fear of her stalker and was afraid that her and her family would never be safe
from him. Id. Judi Markegard endured her stalker's reign of terror for over eight years. Id. Judi
twice moved to a new city and lived with police alarms in her home, taps and tape recorders on her
telephone, spotlights in her windows, and a gun under her pillow. Id,
137. See id. (giving testimony of the effect stalking has had on Dawn Martin's and Judi
Markegard's lives).
138. Id. Connie Martin's daughter was unable to obtain police protection and had no legal
remedy available to her. Id. Though able to obtain a protection order, Dawn Martin was faced with
no criminal legal remedy. Id. Judi Markegard had various criminal and civil remedies available to
her, though none were effective in deterring her stalker, and the more seriously punishable offenses
did not encompass her stalker's conduct. I.
139. LECISLATVE COUNCIL OF NORTH DAKOTA, FINAL BILL STATUS REPORT, FtF-TY-THIRD
LECIsLATvE ASSEMBLY, at 66 (1993) (citing the legislative record of the daily status of the stalking bill
from introduction to enactment into law) thereinafter BILL STATUS REPORT].
140. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1. All who testified before the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees supported passing the stalking bill. Id. See also Senate Judiciary
Committee, supra note 16.
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Senate.' 41 The Governor signed the bill into law April 1, 1993,14 and it
became effective April 2, 1993.'"
North Dakota's stalking law'4" contains the intent requirement of
intentional conduct 1" and the act requirement of a "course of conduct
directed at a specific person which frightens, intimidates, or harasses that
person, and which serves no legitimate purpose."146 "Course of conduct"
is further defined as more than one act evidencing a continuity of pur-
pose. 147 This definition reflects a legislative decision that stalking is dif-
141. BiLL STATUS REPORT, supra note 139, at 66. The House of Representatives passed the bill
January 28, 1993. Id. The Senate passed the bill March 16, 1993. Id
142. Id
143. See 1993 N.D. Laws oh. 120, § 3. North Dakota declared the crime of stalking an
emergency measure. Id. An emergency measure allows a law to become effective immediately
rather than at some future specified date. N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 41 (providing that an emergency
measure takes effect upon its filing with the secretary of state or on a date specified in the measure.
Because the emergency measure contained in the bill did not declare an effective date, 1993 N.D.
Laws oh. 120, § 3, the bill became effective upon its filing with the secretary of state. BiL. STATUS
REPORT, supra note 139, at 66. The secretary of state filed the bill on April 2, 1993. Id.
144. N.D. Cent. Cede § 12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1993).
Stalking
1. As used in this section:
a. "Course of conduct- means a pattern of conduct consisting of two or more acts
evidencing a continuity of purpose. The term does not include constitutionally
protected activity.
b. "Stalk" means to engage in an intentional course of conduct directed at a specific
person which frightens, intimidates, or harasses that person, and which serves no
legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a
reasonable person to experience fear, intimidation, or harassment.
2. No person may intentionally stalk another person.
3. In any prosecution under this section, it is not a defense that the actor was not given
actual notice that the person did not want the actor to contact or follow the person;
nor is it a defense that the actor did not intend to frighten, intimidate, or harass the
person. An attempt to contact or follow a person after being given actual notice that
the person does not want to be contacted or followed is prima facie evidence that the
actor intends to stalk that person.
4. In any prosecution under this section, it is a defense that a private investigator
licensed under chapter 43-30 or a peace officer licensed under chapter 12-63 was
acting within the scope of employment.
5. If a person claims to have been engaged in constitutionally protected activity, the
court shall determine the validity of the claim as a matter o law and, if found valid,
shall exclude evidence of the activity.
6. a. A person who violates this section is guilty of a class C felony if:
(1) The person previously has been convicted of violating section 12.1-17-01,
12.1-17-01.1, 12.1-17-02, 12.1-17-04, 12.1-17-05, or 12.1-17-07 or a similar
offense in another state, involving the victim of the stalking;
(2) The stalking violates a court, order issued under cha ter 14-07.1 protecting
the victim of the stalking, if the person had notice of the court order; or
(3) The person previously has been convicted of violating this section.
b. If subdivision a does not apply, a person who violates this section is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
Id
145. § 12.1-17-07.1(2). "No person may intentionally stalk another person.- Id. Intentionally is
further defined as "purpose to do so." § 12.1-02-02(1)(a) (1985). Intentional is also included in the
definition of "stalk." j 12.1-17-07.1(1)(b) ("'stalk' means to engage in an intentional course of
conduct...-).146. §12.1-17-07.1(1)(b).
147. § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(a). Course of conduct is defined as "a pattern of conduct consisting of
two or more acts evidencing a continuity of purpose." Id. Jim Vukelic, Chief Deputy Attorney
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ferent than other crimes.' 48 Stalking is not an isolated incident, but a
series of acts taken together.1
49
Not only must more than one act be committed,'-' but those acts
must be such as "would cause a reasonable person to experience fear,
intimidation, or harassment.""1 The reasonable person standard protects
an accused person from prosecution if that person's conduct would have
offended only a hypersensitive person'
5 2
The act element of North Dakota's stalking law also contains the
phrase "which serves no legitimate purpose."'" This phrase is not
defined in the law,"5 reflecting a legislative decision that the phrase's
meaning is clear." When words are not defined in a statute, they will be
understood in their ordinary sense.15
The stalking law explicitly excludes constitutionally protected activ-
ity, stating that "[course of conduct] . .. does not include constitutionally
protected activity."'157 The law also creates a general exclusion of consti-
tutionally protected activity through its definition of stalking.'15  Stalking
is defined to include conduct "which serves no legitimate purpose."'
59 If
an accused person claims to have been engaged in constitutionally pro-
tected activity, a hearing is provided to determine the validity of the
claim."6 If the claim is valid, the court will exclude the evidence. 6'
General for the State of North Dakota, testified in support of the stalking bill. House Judiciary
Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Jim Vukelic). Vukelic's testimony included
information about the basic provisions of the bill as well as where the bill originated. Id. Vukelic
stated that more than one act must be committed before a prosecution may be initiated. Id. While
the prohibited "act" is not further defined in the law, see generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1
(Supp. 1993), it seems reasonable that contacting or following a person is the act that the legislature
intended to prohibit. See § 12.1-17-07.1(3) (defining the defenses that a defendant cannot raise in a
prosecution, one of which refers to contacting or following a person).
148. House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1. Representative Ron Carlisle, testifying in
support of the stalking bill, stated that "[w]e have laws that prohibit assault, menacing and terrorizing
but none that deal with stalking." Id.
149. Kathleen G. McAnaney et al., From Imprudence To Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 819, 830 (1993). The authors discuss the use of other criminal laws to control stalking
and state that "these laws were not specifically designed to punish a series of behaviors...." Id.
150. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(a) (Supp. 1993).
151. § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(b).
152. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Jim Vukelic). The
offensive conduct rohibited by the stalking law is judged according to the reasonable person. Id.
'[A] person can't be prosecuted where his conduct wouldn't bother a 'normal' person but was
offensive to someone who is very easily frightened." Id.
153. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(b) (Supp. 1993).
154. See § 12.1-17-07.1.
155. See, e.g., County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y of N. Dakota, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325
(N.D. 1985). In Stutsman, the legislature did not define a term in a statute. Id. The Supreme Court
interpreted the statute "to ascertain the intent of the Legislature" and stated that'.., the legislative
intent is presumed clear from the face of the statute." Id.
156. Burlington N. R.R. v. State, 500 N.W.2d 615, 617 (N.D. 1993).
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(a) (Supp. 1993).
158. § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(b).
159. Id.
160. § 12.1-17-07.1(5).161. Id.
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Because the evidence supporting the charge of stalking is excluded, the
practical effect is the dismissal of the case.' 62
In addition to excluding constitutionally protected and other legiti-
mate activities,', North Dakota's stalking law specifically excludes two
other legitimate activities.' 4 A private investigator or licensed peace
officer is permitted to raise an affirmative defense to a charge of stalking
if acting within the scope of employment.'65 These affirmative defenses
reflect the notion that protecting legitimate activity is in the public
interest.166
Though providing an affirmative defense for private investigators and
licensed peace officers,'6 7 North Dakota's stalking law prohibits defend-
ants from raising two defenses.' s Defendants cannot raise the defense
that their victims never told them to stop contacting or following them.' 69
If a defendant attempts to contact or follow the victim after being told
that the victim does not want to be contacted or followed, the attempt is
prima facie evidence that the defendant intends to stalk the victim. 70
This provision may be treated in one of two ways: as a method of proof,
or as a statutory presumption.' 71 If treated as a method of proof, the
prima facie evidence of continued contacting or following would be sub-
mitted to the jury "with the usual instructions on burden of proof and
without additional instructions attributing any special probative force to
the facts proved. 172
Alternatively, the provision could be treated as an implied legislative
statutory presumption.' 73 The attempt to contact or follow is the physical
fact upon which the mental fact, the intent to stalk, may follow. 174 Statu-
tory presumptions in criminal laws are "proper so long as there is a
162. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note I (citing the testimony of Jim Vukelic).
163. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(a), (b) (Supp. 1993).
164. See § 12.1-17-07.1(4).
165. I.
166. Robinson, supra note 88, at 518 (discussing the insubstantial privacy interest of a person
when in public and the public interest in protecting legitimate activity).
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(4) (Supp. 1993).
168. § 12.1-17-07.1(3).
169. Id. (stating that "it is not a defense that the actor was not given actual notice that the person
did not want the actor to contact or follow the person...
170. Id.
171. See supra notes 172-177 (discussing method of proof and statutory presumption).
172. N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-01-03(5) (Supp. 1993). "When a statute declares that given facts
constitute a prima facie case, proof of such facts warrant submission of a case to the jury with the
usual instructions on burden of proof and without additional instructions attributing any special
probative force to the facts provedl." Id. (emphasis added). North Dakota's stalking law labels the
continued contacting or following as prima facie evidence rather than as a prima facie case. Compare
§ 12.1-17-07.1(3) with § 12.1-01-03(5). However, since prima facie evidence relates to the facts
constituting a prima facie case, it seems reasonable that the method of proof would still be governed
by section 12.1-01-03(5) of the North Dakota Century Code. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1189-90
(6th ed. 1990) (defining prima facie case and prima facie evidence).
173. LaFave, supra note 56, § 1.8 at 57 (discussing statutory presumptions).
174. I&
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rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact pre-
sumed,"175 and the presumed fact must follow beyond a reasonable doubt
from proof of the proven fact.'7 6 Thus, in North Dakota's stalking law,
the presumed fact of intent to stalk would have to follow beyond a reason-
able doubt from proof that the stalker continued to contact or follow the
victim after being told to stop, and the jury must be able to make a
rational connection between the continued contacting or following and an
intent to stalk.177
Defendants also cannot claim that they did not intend to frighten,
intimidate, or harass their victims. 178 As long as the victim is reasonably
frightened, intimidated, or harassed by the defendant's conduct, an ele-
ment of the crime has been met.'79 The defendant need only have the
intent to do the act that results in fear, intimidation, or harassment."8
Not allowing this second defense of intent generated considerable
discussion at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing because of the con-
cern that a strict liability offense was being created. 181 Strict liability
175. City of Dickinson v. Gresz, 450 N.W.2d 216, 219 (N.D. 1989) (citing Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943)).
176. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Martin, 446 A.2d 965, 968-69 (Pa. 1982)).
177. Id. At issue in Gresz was a retail theft-shoplifting ordinance containing an express
presumption. Id. at 218. The presumption stated that if a person conceals and removes merchandise
ro a store without paying for it, that person is prima facie presumed to have intended to deprive
the merchant of the merchandise. Id. at 218-19 n.4. The court had no difficulty in finding tat a
rational connection existed between concealing merchandise and an intent to deprive a merchant. Id.
at 220-21. Moreover, the court stated that the factfinder's responsibility of finding all facts beyond a
reasonable doubt was not undermined by the prima facie presumption of intent, because the
presumption created evidence of guilt and permitted, but did not compel, a finding of guilt. Id. at
220. "[T]he application of the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard [would be affected] only if,
under the facts of the case, there is no reasonable way the [factfinders] could make the connection
permitted by the [presumption]." Id.
178. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(3) (Supp. 1993). Frightening, intimidating, or harassing
a person can be thought of as the results of engaging in stalking conduct. House Judiciary
Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Jim Vukelic). Vukelic stated that the prosecution
must still prove that the defendant intentionally engaged in conduct "which had the effect of
[frightening,] intimidating or harassing a reasonable person." Id. Thus, not allowing the defense
prevents a defendant from claiming lack of intent with respect to the results of that defendant's
conduct, but does not remove the state's burden of proving intent with respect to that defendant's
conduct. See LaFave, supra note 56, § 3.4 at 215 (discussing the elements of crimes, which may
include not only an act but a result of that act).
179. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(b) (Supp. 1993). 'The course of conduct must be
such as would cause a reasonable person to experience fear, intimidation, or harassment." Id.
180. House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Jim Vukelic).
Prohibiting this defense makes it easier for prosecutors to convict a stalker, since the prosecution only
has to prove that the stalker intentionally engaged in stalking but does not have to contend with a
defense that the stalking was not part of an intentional scheme to frighten, intimidate, or harass the
victim. See Karen A. Brooks, The New Stalking Laws: Are They Adequate To End Violence?, 14
HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & PoL'Y 259, 274 (1993) (discussing the intent requirement of Washington's
stalking law, which includes language prohibiting stalkers from claiming that they did not intend to
frighten, intimidate, or harass their victim).
181. See Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 16 (citing the statement of Senator Jim
Maxson). Senator Jim Maxson wanted to delete the second defense and let the reasonable person
standard prevail. Id. Maxson stated, "we're making [stalking] a strict liability offense." Id.
1994] NOTE
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offenses are crimes which require no intent. 18 2 These offenses are within
the authority of the legislature and do not violate a defendant's presump-
tion of innocence as long as the burden of proof is not shifted to the
defendant.',8 The prosecution must still have the burden of proving each
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'8 4 Even though North
Dakota's stalking law prohibits a defendant from claiming a lack of intent
to frighten, intimidate, or harass the victim, the stalking law is not a strict
liability offense, since the prosecution must still prove that the defendant
intentionally engaged in the conduct that reasonably frightened, intimi-
dated, or harassed the victim. 18
A further reason for not allowing this second defense of intent was to
prevent jury nullification." Jury nullification occurs when a jury, based
on its own sense of justice and fairness, refuses to follow the law and
acquits a defendant even though the facts suggest that the defendant is
guilty.' The drafters wanted to avoid this possible result, and therefore,
removed the ability of defendants to claim that they did not intend to
frighten, intimidate, or harass their victims.' 88
A first-time violation of North Dakota's stalking law is a class A mis-
demeanor punishable by one year's imprisonment, a fine of $1,000, or
both.189 If the defendant has a prior conviction for simple assault, assault,
aggravated assault, terrorizing, menacing, harassment, or stalking, the
penalty is increased to a class C felony of five years' imprisonment, a fine
of $5,000, or both.'9 ° Violating a domestic violence protection order also
increases the penalty to a class C felony.191
182. State v. Vogel, 467 N.W.2d 86, 90 (N.D. 1991) (giving examples of strict liability offenses,
such as driving without liability insurance and insufficient funds).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07.1(2). "No person may intentionally stalk another person.
Id. See also Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 16 (citing the testimony of Jim Vukelic). Vukelic
stated that it is not a strict liability offense because there still has to be the element of intent to engage
in the conduct. Id.
186. See Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 16, at 3 (citing the testimony of Representive
Jennifer Ring). Representative Ring stated that part of the reason for not allowing the defense was
jury nullification. Id. Ring explained with the folowing scenario: "When a case got to court, there
might be a nice, respectable-looking defendant who would say, 'I'm a sterling member of the
community, and I never intended to do anything.' And there's a tendency for juries to say, 'Well, if he
didn't intend it, we don't want to send him to jail.'- Id
187. M. Kristine Creagan, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent Legislative Developments, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101 (1993).
188. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(3) (Supp. 1993). The prosecution must still prove that
the defendant intentionally engaged in the conduct. House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing
the testimony of Jim Vukelic).
189. N.D. CENT. CODE J 12.1-17-07.1(6)(b) (Supp. 1993). The first offense is a class A
misdemeanor. Id. See also § 12.1-32-01(5) (1985) (defining penalty for class A misdemeanor).
190. 12.1-17-07.1(6)(a)(1), (3); § 12,1-32-01(4) (defining penalty for class C felony).
191. § 12.1-17-07 .1(6)(a)(2). The defendant must have had notice of the protection order, Id.
[Vol. 70:159
1994] NOTE
North Dakota's stalking law criminalizes conduct that other legal
remedies failed to address.' 92 Yet, since the inception of stalking laws,
much controversy has surrounded them."°3 The concern most often
expressed is that the laws are overbroad and vague, and therefore, the
critics contend that the laws will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.' 94
North Dakota's stalking law also faced this criticism.'
No stalking law has faced a constitutional challenge at the appellate
level. 19' An evaluation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines may
indicate the factors that the North Dakota Supreme Court would examine
in determining the constitutionality of North Dakota's stalking law.
197
1. The Doctrine Of Overbreadth
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the First
Amendment needs "breathing space" to ensure that people are not afraid
to exercise their constitutionally protected rights because of the threat of
criminal penalty.1 98 The overbreadth doctrine states that government
cannot control or prevent activities "by means which sweep unnecessarily
broad and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms,"'99 such as
freedom of mobility,2°° freedom of speech, 20 1 and freedom of assem-
bly.20 2 The Supreme Court, however, has curtailed the use of the over-
breadth doctrine by requiring that the overbreadth be "substantial" in its
potential application to First Amendment activities.203 This "substantial
192. See infra notes 252-264 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of adding North
Dakota's stalking law to the legal system).
193. Bradburn, supra note 22, at 285. One of the biggest critics of the new stalking laws is the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Id. The ACLU believes that the laws extend into
constitutionally protected activity. Id. One author quoted the statement of a criminal defense lawyer:
"The problem with some of these statutes ...is that they will not pass constitutional muster."
Resnick, supra note 7, at 27. Id. See also Puente, supra note 13, at 9A (discussing some of the
constitutional concerns of stalking laws).
194. Bradburn, supra note 22, at 285.
195. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Greg Runge). Greg
Runge, a representative of North Dakota's ACLU, testified that the ACLU neither supports nor
opposes stalking laws. Id. However, Runge further added that the ACLU's most important concern
is that the laws are dangerously broad and vague and may criminalize constitutionally protected
activity. Id.
196. George Lardner, Jr., Anti-Stalking Laws Proliferate; Several Face Court Challenges, WASH.
PosT, April 30, 1993, at A2. Lardner reports that a National Criminal justice Association survey
revealed four lower court decisions, one upholding and three overturning, the new stalking laws. Id.
197. Bradburn, supra note 22, at 285. The primary concern of the new stalking laws is that they
are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Id.
198. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611, 615 (1971).
199. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967).
200. City of Fargo v. Stensland, 492 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1992) (involving a challenge to a DUI
statute on grounds that it infringed on the constitutionally protected freedom of intrastate travel).
201. Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Lambs of Christ, 488 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1992)
(involving a challenge to a preliminary injunction on grounds that it infringed on right of free speech
and assembly).
202. Id.
203. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
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overbreadth" standard is applicable where the prohibited activity involves
conduct and not merely speech.2 04 Thus, the Court shows more defer-
ence to laws which proscribe conduct rather than speech. 2
The North Dakota Supreme Court follows the United States
Supreme Court's overbreadth doctrine,2°6 and like the United States
Supreme Court, the North Dakota Supreme Court has made a distinction
between speech and conduct.207 When reviewing an overbreadth claim,
the North Dakota Supreme Court will not declare a law unconstitutional
unless the statute "infringes upon a 'substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct."' 2 8 Thus, the distinction between speech and con-
duct is critical.2°9
North Dakota's stalking law is worded to proscribe conduct, not
speech,10 thereby making it more likely the North Dakota Supreme
Court would uphold the law.211 The law also specifies intent and types of
prohibited conduct.212 If a law contains these two elements, the court is
less likely to sustain an overbreadth challenge because the law's applica-
204. Id (stating that "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved .... the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep.")
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., City of Fargo v. Stensland, 492 N.W.2d 591, 593 (N.D. 1992). In Stensland, a
DUI statute was challenged as being unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. In examining the challenge,
the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that "the doctrine of overbreadth prohibits the law from
criminalizing constitutionally protected activity." Id. "'A governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broad and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'" Id. (citing Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967)).
207. State v. Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d 243,250 (N.D. 1975). In Woodworth, the court upheld a
disturbing the peace statute against an overbreadth challenge. Id. The court stated that the statute
sought only to proscribe conduct and was not directed at regulating speech. Id. at 249.
208. Stensland, 492 N.W.2d at 593 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489,
494 (1982)).
209. Id.
210. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(a), (b) (Supp. 1993). The law prohibits a person from
intentionally engaging in more than one act "directed at a specific person which frightens, intimidates,
or harasses that person, and which serves no legitimate purpose." Id.
211. Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d at 249 (upholding a statute directed at conduct, not speech);
Stensland, 492 N.W.2d at 593 (stating that a statute must substantially infringe upon constitutionally
protected activity).
212. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(2) (Supp. 1993). "No person may intentionally stalk
another person." ld Intentional is also included in the definition of "stalk." § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(b)
("'stalk' means to engage in an intentional course of conduct.. ."). See also supra note 210 (defining
prohibited conduct).
1994]
tion is limited solely to blameworthy conduct.213 Additionally, constitu-
tionally protected activity is not a target of North Dakota's stalking law.
214
The law contains two explicit protections against an invasion into
protected freedoms.2 15 First, "constitutionally protected activity" is spe-
cifically excluded from the prohibited stalking conduct.2 16 Second, the
law provides for a hearing if a person claims to have been engaged in
constitutionally protected activity.2 1 7 If the claim is valid, the case is dis-
missed.21 8 These two explicit protections indicate a legislative intent to
not criminalize constitutionally protected activity under North Dakota's
stalking law and, therefore, should protect the law from an overbreadth
attack.2 19
By explicitly excluding constitutionally protected activity and limiting
its application solely to blameworthy conduct, North Dakota's stalking law
should be safeguarded from an overbreadth challenge.220
2. Void For Vagueness
The due process clauses of the North Dakota Constitution and the
United States Constitution prohibit vague criminal laws.2' A law is void
213. See Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Lambs of Christ, 488 N.W.2d 401, 409 (N.D.
1992). In Fargo Women's Health, abortion protesters challenged as overbroad and vague a
preliminary injunction forbidding them from demonstrating outside an abortion clinic. Id. The
reason for the injunction was the protester's past conduct, which included using force on the clinic
staff and patients, trespassing on the clinic's property, and using other harassing and intimidating
tactics, such as screaming and photping and following the clinic staff and patients. Id. at 410.
Finding the injunction valid, the court stated that "[g]iven this background, the protesters cannot
reasonably argue that the [injunction's] prohibition on 'harassing, intimidating or physically abus[ive]
conduct can be mistaken as describing their lawful expressive activities." Id. at 410-11. The court
limited the construction of the injunction to avoid overbreadth by construing it to prohibit "following,
photographing, and videotaping done without consent, and persistently and with the intent to harass
and intimidate." Id. at 411. See also Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d at 249. The court stated that the state
has a legitimate interest in statutorily controlling harmful conduct, even if the statute might deter
some protected speech. Id.
214. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1993). The stalking law specifically excludes
constitutionally protected activity" from the prohibited stalking conduct. § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(a). "If a
person claims to have been engaged in constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine
the validity of the claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude evidence of the activity."
§ 12.1-17-07.1(5).
215. Id.216. §12.1-17-07.1(1)(a).
217. §12.1-17-07.1(5).
218. Id. See also House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Jim
Vukelic). Vukelic stated that the effect of a valid constitutional claim is dismissal of the case. id.
219. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, (1974), reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974). In
reviewing an overbreadth attack on a federal statute, the United States Supreme Court stated that
Congress enacted the statute with the intention of giving those subject to the statute broader rights
than they previously had, and therefore, Con ess obviously did not intend to reach constitutionally
protected activity. id. at 162. Because of ngress' intent, the Court interpreted the statute toexclude constitutionally protected activity, even though th  sta ute did not explicitly so state. Id.
220. See supra notes 198-219 and accompanying text (discussing the overbreadth doctrine as
applied to North Dakota's stalking law).
221. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.D. CONT. art. I, § 12. In Grayned v. City of Rockford 408
U.S. 104 (1972), the United States Supreme Court explained the basic principles of the vagueness
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for vagueness if it "lacks 'ascertainable standards of guilt,' such that it
either forbids or requires 'the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.'"" Vague laws risk offending two essential values of
due process: providing adequate warning of proscribed conduct, and
marking sufficient boundaries for fair administration of the law.M There-
fore, to survive a vagueness challenge, stalking laws must be written with
sufficient clarity and precision to provide adequate notice of proscribed
conduct and to establish clear enforcement guidelines. A
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that a criminal law set-
ting forth an ascertainable standard of guilt will be upheld when attacked
on vagueness grounds.' An ascertainable standard of guilt serves to
notify potential violators of the culpability required and the harm prohib-
ited by the law.2 North Dakota's stalking law meets the first require-
ment of an ascertainable standard of guilt by providing a culpability of
"intentionally."227 The second requirement also is met, because the harm
prohibited by the law is specified as conduct, on more than one occasion,
"which frightens, intimidates, or harasses [the victim]." 22 8  The words
"frighten," "intimidate," or "harass" are not defined in the law,229 but "the
mere use of general language does not support a vagueness challenge." '
If words are undefined in a law, the North Dakota Supreme Court will
look to similar laws, to the dictionary, or to whether "the questioned
words have a common and generally accepted meaning."23 1 Further-
more, in ascertaining the meaning of words, the court will consider the
context of the prohibited conduct.z 2
doctrine. Id. at 108. These same principles are applied under the North Dakota Constitution.
Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d at 245-46 (explaining the vagueness doctrine).
222. State v. Tibor, 373 N.W.2d 877, 880 (N.D. 1985).
223. Id. (mentioning the two essential values of due process). See also Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d
at 245 (explaining the two essential values of due process in greater detail).
224. State v. Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d 243, 245 (N.D. 1975) (explaining the requirement of
definiteness for a criminal law).
225. State v. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1977). "In order that a criminal 'statute may stand
when [attacked as vague], the statute must set forth an ascertainable standard of guilt." Id. at 366.
226. Id. at 366-67 (finding that the reckless endangerment criminal statute provided an
ascertainable standard of guilt by setting forth culpability of recklessness and describing the
prohibited behavior as creating a risk of serious bodily injury or death).
227. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(2) (Supp. 1993). The law prohibits a person from
intentionally stalking another person. Id.
228. § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(a), (b).
229. Id.
230. State v. Woodworth, 234 N.W.2d 243, 245 (N.D. 1975).
231. State v. Johnson, 417 N.W.2d 365, 368 (N.D. 1987).
232. See supra note 213 (discussing Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Lambs of Christ, in
which the court found the injunction prohibiting "harassing, intimidating, or physically abusing" the
abortion clinic staff and patients not to be vague when considered in the context of the abortion
protester's past conduct).
1994] NOTE
Not only must the prohibited conduct frighten, intimidate, or harass
a victim, but it must also serve no legitimate purpose.' "Legitimate pur-
pose" is not further defined in the law.234 However, the North Dakota
Supreme Court has upheld, against a vagueness challenge, a criminal law
containing similar language.2 North Dakota's stalking law contains an
ascertainable standard of guilt with its required culpability and prohibited
harm.' Therefore, persons are able to determine what conduct renders
them liable under the law,237 and the first essential value of due process is
satisfied.'
An ascertainable standard of guilt also marks sufficient boundaries
for fair administration of the law,2 9 which is the second essential value of
due process.' ° A criminal law must not be so "vague and standardless
that it leaves the judges and jurors free to decide what is or is not prohib-
ited by the [law]."2 41 By providing a culpability element and requiring a
prohibited harm, 2 North Dakota's stalking law accommodates the
judges' and jurors' processes of determining whether there has been a
deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. 43 Therefore, judges and
jurors are not given boundless discretion in administering the law, and the
second essential value of due process is not violated.2 "
North Dakota's stalking law does not likely suffer from either over-
breadth or vagueness.' 5 The law has adequate safeguards against
extending into constitutionally protected activity246 and provides fair
notice of proscribed conduct as well as clear enforcement guidelines."'7
233. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(b) (Supp. 1993).
234. id.
235. Johnson, 417 N.W.2d at 368-69 (upholding, against a vagueness challenge, a criminal law
that prohibited a person from possessing explosives unless to "affect a lawful and legitimate
purpose").
236. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (defining culpability and prohibited harm).
See also State v. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d 364, 366-67 (N.D. 1977) (holding that to withstand a vagueness
attack, a criminal law must set forth an ascertainable standard of guilt, which consists of a culpability
and a rohibited harm).
237. Id.
238. Id. (citing the two essential values of due process).
239. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d at 367 (finding that the reckless endangerment statute's culpability
requirement of "recklessly" and its prohibition of only conduct creating a risk of serious bodily injury
or death provided an ascertainable standard of guilt and satisfied the two essential values of due
process).
240. Id. (citing the two essential values of due process).
241. State v. Johnson, 417 N.W.2d, 365, 369 (N.D. 1987).
242. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (defining culpability and prohibited harm).
243. Hanson, 256 N.W.2d at 366-67 (finding that reckless endangerment statute which required
culpability of "recklessly" and prohibited harm of creating a risk of serious bodily injury or death was
sutciently distinct for judges and jurors to fairly administer the law).
244. Id
245. See supra notes 198-244 and accompanying text (discussing overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines as applied to North Dakota's stalking law).
246. See supra notes 198-220 and accompanying text (discussing overbreadth doctrine as
applied to North Dakota's stalking law).
247. See supra notes 221-244 and accompanying text (discussing vagueness doctrine as applied
to North Dakota's stalking law).
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Other states' stalking laws are more broadly drawn and may attempt to
proscribe nondangerous or even constitutionally protected activity.' At
the other end of the spectrum are stalking laws so narrowly drawn in an
attempt to retain their constitutionality that stalkers may entirely avoid
prosecution because their actions do not fall within the proscribed con-
duct." 9 North Dakota's stalking law lies somewhere between the nar-
rowly drawn and broadly drawn stalking laws.250 Therefore, it should
serve to punish most stalking conduct while retaining its
constitutionality.251
B. AN IMPORTANT ADDITION TO THE LEGAL ARSENAL
North Dakota's stalking law is an important addition to the legal arse-
nal because it accounts for the nature of stalking conduct and punishes it
with adequate penalties. z 2 The law recognizes that stalking is serious
conduct warranting a serious remedy and upholds the constitutional right
of stalking victims to have a remedy for injury to them.25
The stalking law fills a void by providing a remedy for those stalking
victims who otherwise had none25 and by expressing its disapproval of
248. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West 1992) ("Any person who willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense of stalking."). Some
commentators have criticized Florida's stalking law as being too broad and vague. Thomas, supra
note 12, at 130-31; Robert A. Guy, Jr., The Nature And Constitutionality Of Stalking Laws, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 991, 1017 (1993).
249. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A (1992). Delaware's stalking law prohibits the
following or harassment of a person when combined with making a "credible threat." Id. Often, the
stalker's conduct does not qualify as a "credible threat." Bradburn, supra note 22, at 283-84.
Delaware patterned its stalking law after California's. Compare DEL. ANN. ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A
(1992) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). However, California's law was so narrow
that it prevented many stalkers from being prosecuted. Marsha Ginsburg, Tougher Law Takes New
Aim At Stalkers, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, January 2, 1994, at A-1. Therefore, California recently
amended its stalking law by liberalizing the language of "credible threat." Id. at A-8.
250. See N.D. CErr. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1 (Supp. 1993). North Dakota's stalking law does not
require a "credible threat," which narrows the application of the law, but it does require more than
simply following a person, which broadens the application of the law. Id.
251. See supra notes 198-250 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional challenges as
applied to North Dakota's stalking law and as compared to other states' stalking laws).
252. See infra notes 253-264 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of adding North
Dakota's stalking law to the legal system). Along with the new stalking law, North Dakota enacted a
law providing for a disorderly conduct restraining order, 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 125, § 2 (codified at
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (Supp. 1993)), and amended a law increasing the penalties for
violating a domestic violence protection order, 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 147, § 2 (codified at N.D. CENT.
CODE 14-07.1-06 (Supp. 1993)).
253. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9 (declaring that "every man for ever), injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law").
254. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Connie Martin and
Dawn Martin). Connie Martin's daughter had no legal remedy available to her. Id. Dawn Martin
also had no legal remedy available to her. Id. However, Dawn was able to convince a court that a
protection order was necessary in her case even though she did not meet the requirements for
obtaining a protection order. Id.
stalking with adequate penalties for punishing stalkers. North Dakota's
earlier criminal remedies were not sufficiently comprehensive, thereby
precluding many stalking victims from relief because their stalker's con-
duct did not rise to the level of a criminal violation." 6 Moreover, the
penalties for stalking are significantly stricter than those for similar
offenses, 2 7 and the increased penalty for those stalkers with prior convic-
tions acknowledges that stalkers who remain undeterred are probably the
most dangerous stalkers and are in need of higher punishments.z 8 A
criminal remedy also affords victims less costly and more immediate relief
than civil remedies" 9 so that stalking victims will not have to bear the
expense and uncertainty of tort actions or protection orders.2 °
North Dakota's stalking law acknowledges that law enforcement
authorities are in need of specific legislation to address the stalking prob-
lem and to help them perform their function. 26 1 However, this grant of
new authority does not necessarily ensure that stalking victims will receive
adequate police protection, 62 nor does this grant of a new remedy to
stalking victims ensure the law's potential to control stalking.2 ' The true
test of the law will be whether law enforcement authorities use this new
tool and provide expedited protection to stalking victims.2
255. Johannes Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. Crim. L. Criminology
& Police Sci. 176, 192 (1952) (stating that "[p]unishment is an expression of society's disapproval of
the act, and the degree of disapproval is expressed by the magnitude of punishment").
256. See supra notes 49-87 and accompanying text (discussing limited applicability of North
Dakota's criminal remedies in the stalking context). See also supra note 254 (citing the testimony of
stalking victims who did not have a legal remedy available to them).
257. N.D. CEr. CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(6) (Supp. 1993). A first offense for stalking is a class A
misdemeanor. Id. A first offense for a similar crime, such as simple assault, harassment, or disorderly
conduct, is a class B misdemeanor. See § 12.1-17-01 (Supp. 1993); § 12.1-17-07 (1985); § 12.1-31-01
(Supp. 1993).
258. § 12.1-17-07.1(6). A stalker with a prior conviction for stalking or a similar offense or a
prior violation of a protection order may be convicted of a class C felony. Id.
259. Thomas, supra note 12. Unlike the civil system in which the victim is responsibile for
initiating and bearing the cost of legal proceedings, in the criminal system, the state is responsible for
initiating and paying for the proceedings. Id. at 128. Also, upon the commission of a crime, the state
may begin legal proceedings immediately, while civil proceedings may require burdensome filing
procedures and time delays. Id. at 128-29.
260. See supra notes 88-134 and accompanying text (discussing the expense, uncertainty, and
ineffectiveness of North Dakota's civil remedies in the stalking context).
261. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the statement of Captain Dan
Draovich). Draovich stated that law enforcement authorities are "very frustrated and are unable to
do their jobs due to lack of appropriate legislation." Id.
262. See Senate judiciary Committee, supra note 16 (citing the statement of Senator im
Maxson). Maxson stated that "the attitude of law enforcement, prosecuting attorneys and judges
would be a far greater antidote for the problem [of stalking] than legislation." Id.
263. See Gilligan, supra note 17. "No law will ever provide a fail-safe solution to the terror that
victims endure at the hands of obsessed stalkers. The possibility exists that a stalker completely
determined to harass, scare, or even kill his or her victim ultimately will succeed." Id. at 335-36.
264. See Senate judiciary Committee, supra note 16 (citing the statement of Senator Jim
Maxson). Maxson was skeptical of the ability of a new law to be effective in combatting stalking, and
instead, believed that "the attitude of law enforcement, prosecuting attorneys and judges would be a
far greater antidote .. ." Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
North Dakota's legal system has been unable to effectively serve
stalking victims. Traditional criminal remedies are not sufficiently com-
prehensive, and when a criminal remedy is applicable to stalking, it often
carries a sanction that does not adequately deter stalking. Civil remedies
are expensive and uncertain, and particularly in the case of protection
orders, ineffective.
Along with the other fifty states, North Dakota recognized that stalk-
ing is serious conduct warranting a serious remedy and responded to the
stalking victim's plea for help by enacting a stalking law. The law is an
important addition to the legal arsenal because it accounts for the nature
of stalking and punishes it with adequate penalties. The law grants new
authority in an area in which there has been none and empowers law
enforcement authorities to make arrests for a crime before a more serious
crime is committed. Furthermore, because North Dakota's stalking law
achieves a balance between the more narrowly and more broadly drawn
stalking laws, it should serve to punish most stalking behavior and still
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
A local tragedy has been the impetus for most stalking laws.'
Sadly, North Dakota has this in common with other states enacting stalk-
ing laws. Pam Norman's estranged husband, free on bond after violating
Pam's protection order, shot her to death. 2" North Dakota's stalking law
is an effort to stop such-tragedies.
Tracy Vigness Kolb
265. See Beck, supra note 15, at 60.
266. See House Judiciary Committee, supra note 1 (citing the testimony of Sue Leingang, sister
of Pam Norman).
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